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HORNE v USDA: THE TAKINGS CLAUSE, THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND THE 'WORLD'S MOST
OUTDATED LAW"

Thomas E. Travis*
"Life, liberty, andproperty do not exist because men have made laws. On the
contrary, it was thefact that life, liberty, andproperty existed beforehandthat
caused men to make laws in thefirstplace."

principle of
property rights is a foundational
in
irm conviction
American
thought and jurisprudence. Thomas Jefferson said,
"The defense of private property is the standard by which every provision of
law, past and present, shall be judged."' Although the United States may
have been conceived in proprietary liberty, over time, shifting legal
standards corroded original purpose, entrusting virtually unlimited authority
within Congress. As the scope of the Commerce Clause expanded, it
chipped away at the property rights secured by the Takings Clause. Modern
attitudes remain within that ideological framework, and will continue as
such, until the Supreme Court swings the pendulum of power back in the
hands of individuals.

F

I. INTRODUCTION

In reviewing the impact of New Deal programs advanced by the
Franklin Roosevelt Administration, one should note not only an expansion
of the general size and scope of the federal government, but a reworking of
Executive Editor of the KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, AND NATURAL
RESOURCES LAw, 2013-2014; B.S. Western Kentucky University, 2012; J.D. University of Kentucky,
expected May 2015. 1 would like to think my family and the tireless efforts of this journal for making
this piece possible. All remaining errors are, of course, my own.
1FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 6 (Foundation for Economic Education ed., Dean Russell
trans., Martino Publishing 2011) (1850), availableat http://fee.org/files/doclib/20121116-TheLaw.pdf.
2Jeremy P. Hopkins, Virginia Institute of Public Policy, The Real Story of Eminent Domain in
Virginia: The Rise, Fall,and Undetermined Future of PrivateProperty Rights in the Commonwealth, VA.
INST. OF PUB. POLICY, at 1, (Dec. 2006), http://www.virginiainstitute.org/pdf/V0020017EminentDomain.pdf (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
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longstanding constitutional law principles. Though Great Depression-era
Supreme Court rulings are most noted for initiating limitless congressional
power by way of the Commerce Clause,' many of these same decisions
implicated Takings Clause4 jurisprudence and marked a dynamic change in
judicial philosophy regarding the relationship between the federal
government and individual property rights. Indeed, with the Supreme
Court holding that Congress's interstate commerce power is "complete and
perfect,"5 where should property owners turn when their land and labor is
implicated in federal economic regulations? Despite the federal courts'
defense of the status quo, the Roberts Court has signaled hope that a
property rights renaissance might be on the horizon,6 and it could arrive in
the near future.
One case in particular, Horne v. Department ofAgriculture,' presented
bold challenges to constitutional precedent that the Court has yet to
address. Essentially, the Hornes contend that being required to hand over a
percentage of their crop to the government amounted to an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment. Instead of issuing a
constitutional decision, the Supreme Court initially turned to a very narrow,
yet unanimous ruling on its first look at the case. On remand, the Ninth
Circuit entered judgment upholding the marketing orders.' On September
8, 2014, the Hornes filed a petition for certiorari, allowing the Roberts
Court a second crack at the merits.9 The case is now back to the Supreme
Court, providing a rare second look at this case.10 Signals, however, from
the first round of hearings in the Supreme Court suggest that the Court
may be willing to free producers and consumers from outdated, tyrannical
statutes. Moreover, the subtleties also signal a potential remodeling of

'U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
4U.S. CONST. amend. V.
sUnited States v. Rock-Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569 (1939).
6 See, e.g., Home v. Dep't of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2063-64 (2013); see Arkansas Game & Fish
Comm'n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 523 (2013); Koontz v. St. John's River Water Mgmt. Dist.,
133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013).
7
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2053.
'See Home v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,2015 U.S.
LEXIS 623 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-275).
9 Id.
1o Id
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constitutional property law, creating clearer and more distinct Takings
Clause principles.
Part I of this note investigates the historical justification of the
Takings Clause, and its clouded treatment following the New Deal
makeover of the Commerce Clause. Part II explains the nuanced
distinctions in current Takings Clause jurisprudence, and the categorical
differences between possessory and regulatory takings. Part III details the
background and issues in Horne, the missed opportunity for the Roberts
Court, and its present opportunity to issue a bold statement in favor of
property rights. Finally, Part IV illustrates why a takings challenge to
agricultural marketing orders should succeed and how it may prove as an
inherent constitutional limitation to Commerce Clause authority.

II. TAKINGS THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEw DEAL
COMMERCE CLAUSE DISCOMFITURE

A. OriginalRestraint
The operational rules for enforcement of the Takings Clause are
fundamentally different in theory from the ideals surrounding its inception.
Early courts saw the Clause as a structural limit on government power.'1
Moreover, they never considered that a property owner must first submit to
a taking before seeking compensation.' 2 In essence, early American jurists
recognized the threat that seizure of private property posed to liberty. They
viewed the Takings Clause not as the means for condemnation, but as a
limit to seizure itself. The rule "whether located in state law, common law,
or the federal Constitution," was a structural impairment to government
action.13

The critical inquiry made by early courts was two-fold: has the
government exceeded its power of eminent domain, and more importantly,

" Joshua D. Hawley, The Beginning ofthe End? Home v. DepartmentofAgriculture and the Future
of Williamson County, 2013 CATO Sup. CT. REv. 245, 252 (2013).
12

13

Id. at 253.
Id. at 252.

402

KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.

[Vol. 7 No.2

had the government provided adequate payment at the time of the taking? 14
The burden was not on the property owner to obtain compensation after
the trespass, but on the government to prove it had not exceeded its
power.'s In that era, the government was really only free to burden property
absent Takings procedures as a matter of public safety or general
environmental welfare; it could independently act as a matter of preventing
nuisances. 6 Any step further was an abuse of government condemnation
power, and compensation was required before the action may proceed.' 7
B. New DealAmbiguity and the Commerce Clause
It can be said that the New Deal birthed the American administrative
state at the cost of institutional limited government ideology.' 8 In a time of
vast economic downtown, desperation made it natural for the populace to
turn to government to deliver them from financial disaster. During the
Great Depression, Congress justified expansionary programs under the
Commerce Clause, claiming greater authority than recognized at the time
regarding the scope of government's power to interfere with private markets
and economic activity.' 9
In the fifty years leading up to the Great Depression, Justices
committed to free market economics and suspicions against economic
regulations influenced the Court.20 During this period the Court considered
"commerce" simply as one facet of the business process, and not a process
constantly ongoing simply as a matter of conducting enterprise. 21 The
distinction was mostly made through judicially created dichotomies and

4

Id. at 253.
1sId. at 247.
* Id at 25 3.
17 Hawley, supra note 12, at 253.
1sSee, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1231
(1994).
19See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a New York state law
limiting the number of hours bakers could work under the doctrine of economic substantive due
process). Direct repudiation of Lochner by New Deal courts reflected the changing judicial
presumptions, conferring governmental authorities more power to regulate economic activity.
20ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 252 (4th ed.
2011).
21 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,
1-2 (1895).
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tests, considering, for example, whether the activity was direct vs. indirect 2
or local vs. national, among others.2 3 Central to this era of jurisprudence
was a belief that the Court acted as a steward to the people that protected
them from threats to their liberty, and a narrow interpretation of the
Commerce Clause was essential to that goal. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
the Court stated that "every journey to a forbidden end begins with the first
step; and the danger of such a step by the federal government in the
direction of taking over the powers of the states is that the end of the
journey may find states so despoiled of their powers, or-what may amount
to the same thing-so relieved of responsibilities... as to reduce them to
little more than geographic subdivisions of the national domain." 24
Essentially, the Court during this period feared the slippery slope that
would come from softening the outer limits of Commerce Clause authority.
While a large part of the rationale for a narrow interpretation stemmed
from notions of federalism and balance of power, it also reflects that
underlying that disposition was a mechanism for protecting individual
actors.
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, however, the Supreme Court
changed its course in Commerce Clause practice, and in so doing,
implicated property rights and restructured Takings Clause doctrine.
Starting with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court decared that
Congress could regulate anything that would affect interstate commerce; in
other words, Congress may regulate something if it has the possibility of
affecting commerce. 25 This marked a distinct change in the Court's attitude
regarding government's role in the economy, reflecting the 1930s
skepticism of market-based economics.
With that perspective firmly in place, the Court in 1942 rendered its
decision in Wickard v. Filburn.26 This case involved wheat quotas
established as part of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 27 Despite the fact
that the individual involved claimed all wheat grown above the allotment
22 Id. at

12, 16-17.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04, 308-09 (1938).
1 Id. at 295-96.
25 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29, 30, 32, 40-42, 43 (1937).
26
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
21 Id. at 113-16.
23

4
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was for personal consumption (and would not be introduced into
commerce), the Court rejected the limitations suggested for the Commerce
Clause.28 All of the "tests" maintained in prior eras were abandoned, as
"questions of federal power cannot be decided simply by finding the activity
in question to be 'production,' nor can consideration of its economic effects
be foreclosed by calling them 'indirect."'2 9 Moreover, this specific claim was
denied not because individual action was necessarily harmful in itself, but
the cumulative effect of similar activity.30 The Court noted that even
though an individual's "own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial in itself, [it] is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial."
Though a takings argument was presented in Wickard, it was made as
an ancillary argument through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and not the Takings Clause.32 In what would be par for the
course for takings challenges to similar statutes in following years, the
Court saw the regulation as a price of doing business in that market and
emphasizing that the choice to farm wheat was voluntary. Perhaps a more
aggressive takings argument would have been successful, but it seems
unlikely considering the philosophical and political approach of the Court
during this period. Thus, following Wickard, farmers were left to discern the
aggregate substantial effect factor and unsuccessfully argue denial of due
process to government trespass on their livelihood.
Not far down the road, the Supreme Court eventually delved into
Takings Clause issues, and changed the nature of proceedings. In United
States v. Causby, the Court found a taking when military jets constantly flew
over a farmer's property disturbing his livelihood and agricultural
operation. 34 In reaching its conclusion, however, the Court also
acknowledged an ideological shift in takings doctrine similar to the
28

Id. at 118-29.
at 123-25.

29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.

at 127-29.
at 127-28.

Wickard 317 U.S. at 129-33.
33

34

id.

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
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changing Commerce Clause attitudes that were ongoing. The Causby case
led courts not to inquire whether the government was invoking its eminent
domain power (and not exceeding their regulatory authority), but instead
read the Tucker Act 5 as a standing offer to pay if it was found to be a
taking." This essentially opened the door for the government to take
whatever it pleased and forced property owner to prove after the fact that a
taking occurred. From this foundation, the Supreme Court would later
create the takings rule from Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City: takings claims are not ripe
until all post-deprivation processes under the Tucker Act in the Court of
Federal Claims have been exhausted.
The New Deal era challenged economic liberty and independence,
particularly for farmers. Following this period, farmers operated knowing
that the government could restrict the use of their land, and seize portions
of their labor at no cost. At the same time, they were expected to allow the
seizure to occur and then prove after thefact that their property was taken to
seek compensation. This is seemingly a contradictory view from early
American notions of property rights, requiring the takings authority to be
defined before governmental action occurred. Under the current system, the
government has swift authority to act as it pleases, while keeping opposition
tied up in the Court of Federal Claims, attempting to get whatever
miniscule compensation they can piece together.
III. POSSESSORY VS. REGULATORY TAKINGS
Notwithstanding the New Deal impact on economic legislation, the
Supreme Court has also carved out distinct Takings Clause rules. The last
half century of Supreme Court jurisprudence outlined two major categories
of cases with respect to what classifies a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth
s 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491(a)(1) (2011); see also Hawley, supra note 12, at 258 (giving the Court of
Federal Claims exclusive jurisdiction over "any claim against the United States for monetary damages
exceeding $10,000" when that claim is "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress
or any regulation of an executive department....in cases not sounding in tort").
3

Hawley, supra note 12, at 262.

* See generally Williamson Cnty. Reg1 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
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Amendment. The first category, possessory takings, occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. " Regulatory
takings, the second category, occur when a government regulation goes "too
far" and leaves no economically viable use of the property.39 Moreover, the
Court underscored the proper relation the government must have between
the issued land regulation and the regulated property itself.4 0 Despite
independent constitutional doctrine, it remains unclear how these principles
interact with the Court's Commerce Clause developments since the 1930s.
A. Possessory Takings
Possessory, or per se takings represent the paradigmatic application of
the Takings Clause, and the Supreme Court has held that "when faced with
a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real
property, this Court has invariably found a taking."4 1 The rule is largely
premised under the idea that the right to exclude, which includes the
government, is "one of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of
property rights."42 This subset of takings is "neat and dean" in comparison
to its regulatory takings counterpart, largely because the magnitude of
intrusion, the economic impact of the property owner, and the importance
of the government interest involved are mostly immaterial.43 It is noted that
the Court frequently views possessory takings as a form of regulatory
takings, though the distinction is operationally meaningless."
The landmark case outlining the basic principles of what constitutes a
possessory taking is Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.45 The
8 See generally Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
' See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (quoting Justice Holmes, "[T]he general rule
at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.").
4 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987); see also Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1994).
41Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427.
42 Id. at 35; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179-80 (1979).
43
Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primerfor the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q 307, 361
(2007).
"Id. at 362 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (discussing that
one category of "regulatory action" deemed a per se taking is "where government requires an owner to
suffer a permanent physical invasion.")).
45Loretto, 458 U.S. at 419.
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case involved a New York statute requiring apartment building owners to
make space available for cable television facilities.46 The cable itself was only
half an inch in diameter and thirty feet in length.4 7 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court found a taking under the maxim that "the traditional rule
that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking."48 The rule
applies "even if the [government]. occup[ies] only relatively insubstantial
amounts of space and do not interfere with the landowner's use of the rest
of his land."49
The per se "Loretto Rule" has been applied in a number of situations
beyond simple condemnation. In United States v. Causby, the Court found a
permanent physical occupation of private property when government use of
airspace for military flights destroyed the use on an individual's chicken
farm.50 Other examples of possessory takings in the mold of Loretto include
"continuous or recurring flood caused by a government dam and
government installation of semi-permanent structures such as concreteanchored fencing or groundwater monitoring wells."s" The rule does not
require constant occupation from the invading party. In Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, the Court found a taking when the government required
opening a private waterway for public use.52 Essentially, the requirement
was a taking because the government transformed private property into
public property, allowing the public to occupy the area. 53
Additionally the Loretto Rule is not limited to real property. In Webb
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, the Supreme Court found a taking
when a Florida statute provided that interest accruing on an interpleader
account would become government property.54 The rule was similarly
applied with respect to interest from attorney's client trust account.55
46

47

4

Id. at 423.

1Id. at 422.

81d. at 441.

49Id. at 430; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (discussing that

"in general (at least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no
matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation.").
so See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946).
s Meltz, supra note 44, at 361.
52KaiserAetna,444 U.S. at 171-72.
s3 Id. at 178-79.
s Webb Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-64 (1980).
ss See, e.g., Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216,238 (2004).
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Further, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals found the rule applicable to the
seizure of Richard Nixon's presidential papers.s6 Thus, it appears that when
a permanent physical occupation or seizure occurs, it applies to real and
personal property equally.
B. Regulatory Takings
While the traditional notion of the Takings Clause involved
government condemnation or physical occupation, the notion of regulatory
takings took root in 1922 with Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.17 This case
involved a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited any practice of coal mining
that would cause the property to cave in.s5 Speaking for the Court, Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that "when [regulation] reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to support the act." 9 Rationalizing the ruling,
Justice Holmes said the regulation "ma[de] it commercially impracticable to
mine certain coal" and that it has "nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it."60
To determine when a regulation becomes a taking, the Court
traditionally applies the three factor Penn Central test: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the
character of the governmental action.61 This is primarily an ad hoc test that
requires the Court to weigh interests based on the factual circumstances of a
particular case. Unsurprisingly, the Penn Centraltest has received criticism
for its ambiguity and vast discretion it confers to judges.62

s6Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
s7 Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5
s Id. at 412.
59
Id. at 413.
6o

Id. at 414.

61 See

Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
e.g., John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three FactorTest Readyfor History's Dustbin?,
at
available
(Jan.
2000),
3
ZONING
DIG.
L.
&
USE
52
LAND
http://www.gelpi.org/gelpi/current-research/documents/RT_PubsLawPennCentral3FactorDustbin.p
62 See,

df.
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council clarified some of the Penn
Central ambiguity. 6 Lucas involved a South Carolina ordinance that
restricted permanent habitable structures on a property recently purchased
for $1 million."4 The new regulation essentially rendered the property
valueless.s Speaking for the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia declared that a
taking occurs "where regulation denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of the land."66 Thus, while Penn Central presents a flexible
ad hoc consideration, Lucas sets its limit at the deprivation of total economic
viability. Beyond that, constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky states: "it
is very difficult to generalize about regulatory takings beyond the statement
that a taking exists if the government denies all economically viable use of
property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use."67
In addition to government regulations prohibiting development or
certain exercises of property rights, regulatory takings also encompass
situations where the government conditions development on compliance
with specific policy objectives. Courts merge two cases together to create a
two-part test to determine whether conditions imposed on a property
owner amount to a taking. First, under the holding of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, there must be a "nexus.. .between the legitimate state
interest and the...condition exacted... "68 Essentially, the condition must be
rationally related to preventing the harms that would correspond with the
undesired activity. Second, under Dolan v. City of Tigard, the condition
must be roughly proportionate to the government's justifications for
regulation. 6' The "rough proportionality test" is based primarily upon
reasonableness, though there is no "precise mechanical calculation." The
government must satisfy both requirements to legitimately condition
development or any other exercise of property rights on compliance with
governmental policy.

63Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003.
6

Id. at 1006-07.

6s Id. at 1003.
66

Id. at 1015.

67CHEMERINSKY, supranote 21, at 667.
6' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1987) (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837).
69Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388.
70

Id. at 391.
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IV. THE HORNE LITIGATION
As part of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
(AMAA) and the California Raisin Marketing Order ("Order"), raisin
growers in California are frequently required to turn over a percentage of
their crop to the federal government. Congress enacted the AMAA as
part of Great Depression efforts to control prices and insulate farmers from
competitive market forces it believed created "unreasonable fluctuations in
supplies and prices." 2 The AMAA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture
to promulgate marketing orders that regulate the sale and delivery of
agricultural goods.73
The law, however, does not apply to "producers" of agricultural
commodities, but only "handlers," defined under the statute as "processors,
associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling" of the
commodities. 74 The California Marketing Order established the Raisin
Administrative Commission (RAC), which sets up annual reserve pools of
raisins that are not to be sold on the open, domestic market. 7s In setting up
reserve pools, the RAC also determines the "reserve-tonnage," or the
portion of the year's crop that must be set aside to effectuate the purpose of
the AMAA. 7 6 Then, the RAC may then sell reserve-tonnage raisins to
handlers for resale in overseas markets, or may direct them to
"noncompetitive domestic markets," such as school lunch programs.7 7
The petitioners in Horne, Marvin and Laura Horne, have been raisin
producers since 1969. They complied with the law for over thirty years
before becoming "disillusioned" with the regulations.7 ' For the 2002-03 and
2003-04 growing seasons, the RAC required them to submit forty-seven
percent and thirty percent of their crops, respectively.79 The first year, the
Homes and other farmers were paid less than the cost of production. The
Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2056.
Id. at 2056-57; see also 7 U.S.C.
1 7 U.S.C. § 608c(1) (2013).
74 Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2057.
71
72

§ 602(4)

75 Id.
76Id

n Id. at 2058.
Id. H
71 See Hawley, supra note 12, at 249.

(2013).
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second season, they were paid nothing at all by the government.so In
attempt to avoid using traditional handlers and thus being required to turn
over their crops, the Hornes sought to run their operation entirely as
"producers" by entering into a partnership through which they themselves
took over the typical duties of "handlers."" The United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) did not accept this solution. An Administrative
Law Judge found that the Hornes were "handlers" who had violated the
AMAA and the Marketing Order." On appeal, a judicial officer agreed,
imposing $202,600 in civil penalties,8 3 and $483,843 for the value of the
raisins 84 that Home failed to place in the reserve pool for the two growing
seasons.85
The Hornes then took their case to Federal District Court, claiming
(1) that they were not "handlers". under the statute and (2) if they were
"handlers," then the requirement to surrender their crops was an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment.86 The district court
rejected both claims.8 As for the takings claim, the court saw the reserve
requirement as a consequence of entering the raisin business. It found that
"in essence, [petitioners] are paying an admissions fee or toll-admittedly a
steep one-for marketing raisins. The government does not force plaintiffs
to grow raisins or to market the raisins; rather, it directs that if they grow
and market raisins, then passing title to their 'reserve tonnage' raisins to the
RAC is the admissions ticket."8
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, 89 but
changed its mind on resolving the merits of the case after declaring a lack of
jurisdiction to hear the case. " Essentially, due to the Tucker Act grant of

goId.
s Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2058.
82 Id

1 7 U.S.C. § 608c(14)(B) (2013) (cited for the statutory source of authority for this penalty).
847 CFR § 989.166(c) (2002) (cited for the regulatory source of authority for this penalty).
s Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2059.
86id.

" Home v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. CV-F-08-1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 11, 2009).
"Id. at *26 (quoting Evans v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554, 563-64 (2006)).
" Horne v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 673 F.3d 1071, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012).
* Despite the Ninth Circuit not officially ruling on the takings claim, the Court rejected it at an
earlier time before issuing its jurisdictional position.
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jurisdiction," the claim was not ripe for federal courts until the petitioners
went through the statutorily prescribed remedial processes in the Court of
Federal Claims.92 From this point, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear the case.
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Clarence Thomas
reversed the jurisdictional ruling of the Ninth Circuit.9 4 The issue was,
however, determined on narrow statutory grounds, resisting an overruling
of Williamson County, and avoiding a ruling on the constitutional merits of
the takings claim.95 Ultimately Justice Thomas concluded that the Ninth
Circuit confused the statutory claim (producers v. handlers) with the
constitutional argument (takings violation). Because an Administrative
Law Judge had already issued an adverse order against the petitioners, the
statute permitted them as handler to seek judicial review of the order97 ,
which authorized federal courts to hear the constitutional claim. 98
Moreover, the Court's finding that the statutory remedy withdraws Tucker
Act jurisdiction over the claim left them with no alternative remedy other
than petitioning the federal courts.99
Following the opinion, the case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit for
a ruling on the merits. 0 0 The Ninth Circuit unsurprisingly upheld the
marketing order for two reasons. First, it held that "the Marketing Order
operates on personal, rather than real property," and that "the Takings
Clause affords less protection to personal than real property."O Second, in
affirming the regulation, the Court reasoned that because the Horne's
retain a residual interest in the proceeds from the raisins, they are "not
completely divested of their property rights."102 The Ninth Circuit panel

" 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15) (2013).
92 Horne, 673 F.3d at 1080.
' Home v. Dep't of Agric., 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), cert granted,81 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S.
Nov. 20, 2012) (No. 12-123).
* Home v. Dep't of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2053 (2013).
9s See id. at 2063.
6 Horne, 133 S. Ct. at 2061.
* 7 U.S.C. § 608c(14)(B) (2013).
SHorne, 133 S. Ct. at 2063.
* Id.

1I0 Id. at 2064.

'o1Horne, 750 F.3d at 1139.
1021d. at 1139.
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rejected the Horne's claim on the ground that an unconstitutional taking
had not occurred.
The primary justification for the first holding stemmed from the
Court's refusal to apply the Loretto rule to tangible personal property. 0 3
Loretto itself was characterized as "very narrow" in scope. 104 More
specifically, the Court's statements regarding the ease of finding takings in
Loretto-type cases underscored the Court's point that it was a rule of limited
application to particular factual circumstances. 15 Further, the Court
distinguished the Loretto rule with Lucas, and concluded that while the
Takings Clause may protect personal property, it receives less protection
than real property.'0 6 This distinction between personal and real property
was key in the panel's conclusion, and paved the way for application of the
much more lenient and deferential regulatory takings doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit justified its second rejection of Loretto because the
reserve requirement did not result in the loss of all economic benefits of
production.107 Essentially, the Court argued that because raisin "handlers"
receive the benefits of the marketing order and the raisins "continue to
work in their benefit" after seizure, the Horne's retain an equitable interest
in their crops. 0 s Further, in the years that the distributions are not zero, the
Horne's receive a share of the gross proceeds from their share of raisins;
some years the profits from the sale of reserve raisins do not exceed the cost
of maintaining the program.109
Instead of applying Loretto to this alleged taking, the Ninth Circuit
instead agreed that the "nexus and rough proportionality" test for Nollan
and Dolan should control in evaluating the program." 0 The Court restated
the rule as "if the government seeks to obtain, through the issuance of a
conditional land use permit, a property interest the outright seizure of
103

id.

Md.

104

'os Id. at 1140 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 437 (1982)
("whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred presents relatively few questions of proof. The
placement of a fixed structure on land or real property is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to
dispute.")) (emphasis added).
106Id.

' Horne, 750 F.3d at 1140.
.0.
Id. at 1141.
109Id.
"1Id.
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which would constitute a taking, the government's imposition of the
condition also constitutes a taking unless it: (1) bears a sufficient nexus with
and (2) is roughly proportional to the specific interest the government seeks
to protect through the permitting process.""1 The Court found this rule
appropriate primarily due to the Horne's voluntarily engaging in this line of
business and placing their raisins in the stream of commerce.12 Moreover,
the marketing order passed the test because (1) the connection between the
marketing order and the governmental goal of maintaining higher raisin
prices is present and (2) because the amount of raisins seized each year
adjusts to market conditions.113
Despite the Supreme Court's initial narrow ruling and the Ninth
Circuit's affirmation on remand, there are some silver linings for property
rights advocates surrounding the development of the case. Justice Elena
Kagan suggested a disfavor for the marketing order within the Court during
oral arguments. When questioning counsel for the USDA at oral
arguments, Justice Kagan (after proposing a jurisdictional resolution) stated,
"And now the Ninth Circuit can go and try to figure out whether this
marketing order is a taking or it's just the world's most outdated law."114
Furthermore, Justice Stephen Breyer, also at oral argument, highlighted a
chief concern of the program as a whole by saying, "I can't believe Congress
wanted the taxpayers to pay for a program that's going to mean they have to
pay higher prices.""s Though this is not necessarily an endorsement for the
Horne claim, it does suggest that members of the Court recognize problems
with regulatory structures seizing private property based 75-year-old
economic ideology.
Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court granted the Horne's
petition for certiorari on January 16, 2015 to hear the case again, this time
on its merits.116 This presents a legal rarity, individual cases are seldom

"'
Id. at 1142.
11
2

d

n1 Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143-44.
114Transcript

12-123).

5

of Oral Argument at 48-49, Home v. Dep't of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (No.

Id.
"6 See Horne v. Department of Agricriculture, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com
/case-files/cases/home-v-department-of-agriculture-2/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); see also Certiorari
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heard twice before the nation's highest court.117 Prior to the grant of
certiorari, some legal scholars suggested that the case could potentially be
ripe for the Court to summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision." 8
Regardless, it appears that this case presents unique constitutional questions
and the Court is finally ready to answer them. Though the Roberts Court
attempted to avoid controversy by narrowly framing the issue the first time
around, this time that option is foreclosed, potentially signaling a
willingness to take a bold stand for property rights.
Regulations similar to this case present questions that have not been so
clearly defined. First, and perhaps most importantly, how do governmental
policies like this fit in the well-established frameworks of regulatory or
possessory takings? There are established principles for each, but the Court
needs to clarify whether a per se rule applies to personal property or whether
personal property may be subject to the regulatory balancing test. Second,
when takings claims come into conflict with the Commerce Clause, what
prevails? Are property rights supreme to economic regulations, or does
Congress have ultimate control? These are unresolved questions that the
Supreme Court will face in upcoming terms, and Horne could be a useful
guide in these future cases.
In addition to the legal ramifications of regulatory marketing orders,
the Horne case has reopened the debate on the virtue of the legacy of this
type of legislation. In the 75 years since the ALAA was implemented,
there is much more debate and economic experimentation than existed in
the middle of the Great Depression. Moreover, given the unique
circumstances surrounding its passage, it is not difficult to see how this type
of statute would appear outdated in a modern economy.

Granted 1 (Order List: 574 U.S.) (an. 16, 2015), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders
/courtorders/011615zr1f2q3.pdf.
117See Ilya Somin, Raisin takings case returns to the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Jan.
16, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/16/raisin-takings-case-returns-tothe-supreme-court/; see also Will Baude, If this isn't a taking, what is?, WASH. POsT (Jan. 8, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/08/if-this-isnt-a-taking-what-is/.
us See Will Baude, Will the Supreme Courtsummarily reverse the raisinscase?, WASH. POST (Jan. 9,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/09/will-the-supreme2015),
court-summarily-reverse-the-raisins-case/.

416

KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L.

[Vol.7 No.2

V. CAN THE TAKINGS CLAUSE DEHYDRATE THE SCOPE OF THE
COMMERCE POWER?

A. Review of the Ninth Circuit'sTakingsJurisprudence
Since the Great Depression-era shift in economic perspective and the
promulgation of agricultural protectionist legislation, it has become more
troublesome for farmers to freely utilize their land and make use of their
crops as they wish. Government's involvement in agriculture essentially
created a cartel; because it artificially controls the supply, and thus, the
price, of commodities, individual farmers are virtually unarmed in stopping
it. The Takings Clause presents a unique challenge to Commerce Clause
principles and bloated congressional regulatory authority that has developed
since the 1930s.
Perhaps one of the main barriers preventing a takings ruling is the
nature of the claim: the problem itself renders it difficult under current
court precedent.119 Because the regulation physically seizes property, it
would not be difficult to classify the action as a possessory, or per se taking
under the Loretto Rule.120 In Kaiser Aetna v. United State?21 , the Court said
that a taking occurs when the government transformed private property into
public property and in essence allowed the public to occupy the property. 122
By requiring farmers to relinquish control of their crop for uses to be
determined by the RAC, the A1VAA ultimately transfers title of the yearly
percentage of the harvest to the public domain, which under possessory
takings jurisprudence, would require just compensation.
The problem, however, is that with regard to marketing orders, the
government does not seize the land, but only its fruits (i.e., personal
property). Furthermore, the government is arguably not exercising its
eminent domain power, but is instead limiting land use by legislation. The
119 Indeed, simply determining what type of taking was involved determined the outcome in the
Ninth Circuit ruling. Because the court applied the more deferential regulatory takings analysis, it was
much easier for it to conclude no taking had occurred for constitutional purposes. If the court were to
apply Loretto, it would have been much more difficult to rule in favor of the government. See Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
120Id. at 441.
121KaiserAetna,444 U.S. 164.
122Id. at 178-79.
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Supreme Court has recognized that "while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 123
When a property owner is left with no economically viable use of his or her
property, it is a regulatory taking. 124 Therefore, a regulatory taking does not
occur when government action leaves reasonable economic use to the
property. 12 In addition to this determination, the Court considers: (1) the
economic impact of the regulation; (2) its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government
12 The regulatory takings test is far more amorphous and subjective
action.u
than that for possessory takings, and it is much harder for plaintiffs to
succeed in their claims.
When it comes to agricultural marketing orders, neither category in
their traditional definitions of takings claims really fit. Indeed, in Horne, the
lower courts did not affirmatively classify this regulation as either possessory
or regulatory in its review of constitutional principles.127 In reality, it cannot
be neatly placed into either of the two camps as they are currently defined,
giving courts great discretion when such claims are made, and a large
potential margin for error. With that said, given that the marketing order
involves physical confiscation of tangible personal property, "regulatory
possessory takings" cases like this should follow the per se rule of Loretto. In
such cases, regulations involving the direct seizure of private, personal
property should be treated as possessory takings for the purpose of the
litigation. While it is technically neither a physical occupation nor taking of
the land itself, the government is claiming ownership and a present
possessory interest in property. It is not a stretch to conclude that per se
takings may include both real property and identifiable personal property.128
Looking beyond the surface, it appears that the Ninth Circuit may
have mischaracterized Loretto and mistakenly limited its application in
123Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
124

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1064.

125Pa. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138.
126KaiserAetna, 444

U.S. at 175.
See Home v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., No. CV-F-08-1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at *26
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (classifying the claim as a regulatory taking as a result of the Plaintiffs
inability to establish possessory taking principles).
128See generally Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (holding that
interest
earned on client's trust accounts constitutes "private property" for Takings Clause purposes).
127
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personal property takings claims. As stated in Nixon v. United States, "the
actual holding of Loretto makes no mention of a distinction between real
and personal property, nor was any rationale given in the opinion that
might justify such a distinction."'29 Moreover, this marketing order "does
not merely diminish the value of the Homes' property.. .rather, the
government has outright taken title to that property for a public use while
refusing to pay for it."130 Furthermore, as an economic matter, the
distinction becomes even more ambiguous. As Judge Alex Kozinski noted
in the dissent, regardless of the sentimental value that may follow real
property, only the "market value" of the taken property is compensable.13 1 It
therefore follows that for purposes of the Takings Clause, both "real and
personal property are reduced to their cash equivalents."1 32 As such,
"limiting per se takings analysis to cases involving real property is... a crude
boundary with no compelling basis in economics or 'the law." 3
Evaluating the Ninth Circuit's reasoning even closer reveals an equally
untenable justification for its rejection of Loretto in favor of its regulatory
takings analysis. Essentially, the court applied the ad hoc structure of Penn
Central largely because the Home's retained "residual value after the
regulation's application."134 The argument follows that because the original
owners retain some sort of contingent interest after the regulation is
enforced-even if it is nearly nothing or purely hypothetical-the
government can avoid paying compensation for the seizure. The Cato
Institute, in its amicus brief filed on behalf of the Horne family, stated that
use of this rule would eviscerate the per se Loretto rule; it would apply "only
when a particularly uncreative government body forgets to provide the
property owner a meaningless remainder interest."3 s Cato analogized the
situation by concluding that "surely the government may not seize our cars
to deliver the mail and avoid paying just compensation by allowing us to use
Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1284.
Brief for the Cato Institute, et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Certiorari at 9, Horne v.
Dep't of Agric., 2009 WL 4895362 at *26 (Dec. 11, 2009) (No. 14-275) (emphasis in original).
131 Id. at 13 (citing Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 866 (9th Cir.
J., dissenting)).
2001) (Kozinski,
32
1 id.
133Id. (citing Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 51 (1st Cir. 2002) (Selya, J., concurring)).
134 Horne, 750 F.3d at 1141 n. 17.
13sBrief for the Cato Institute, supra note 131, at 15.
129
1"
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them on Sundays."'3 6 The "residual interest" exception seemingly turns the
Takings Clause on its head, applying only out of governmental mistake
rather than necessity.
B. Comparisonto Modern Commerce Clause Doctrine
Of course, even if this constitutional construction is accepted, a
challenge to agricultural marketing orders will have to address the elephant
in the room: Congress's interstate commerce power. Despite the Rehnquist
Court's efforts to reign in congressional authority,"' the Wickard v. Filburn
aggregate economic effect doctrine is still valid law. Therefore, for a
challenge to succeed, the Court must essentially declare that Commerce
Clause regulations may not seize private property without first exercising all
elements of eminent domain; namely, providing just compensation for all
property under the seizure.
This is not the first time a Takings Clause challenge derived from this
exact marketing order. A similar claim was presented in Evans v. United
States, where the Court of Federal Claims found the regulation was not a
taking because it involved no physical invasion of property or direct
appropriation."' Moreover, the Evans Court viewed the regulation not as a
taking of property, but as a toll for admission upon entering the market,
that should be viewed by growers as a cost of business.' The government
is not forcing growers to use their property to grow raisins, and their choice
to do so is done under the understanding that they must comply with
government rules.' 40 Thus, in highly regulated fields, those who enter do so
subject to existing regulations and without an expectation to be free from
those regulations. 141
Dismissing a takings claim on the theory that farmers "choose" to
enter the program is "analogous to denying compensation in an eminent
Id at 4.
...
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
136

U.S. 598, 602 (2000); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 133.
Evans v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554 (Fed. Cl. 2006), cert. denied,552 U.S. 1187 (2008).
139id
140id.
13s

141
Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States, No. 94-5084, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36175, at *4 (Fed.
Cir. Dec. 20, 1995).

KY.J. EQUINE, AGRIC., &NAT. RESOURCES L.

420

[Vol.7 No.2

domain case on the theory that a homeowner who voted against a citywide
referendum on a development, but was outvoted, thereby 'volunteered' to
have his property taken." 142 In reality, there is hardly a choice at all.143
Considering Supreme Court standards from Wickard and Gonzalez v.
Raich,'" it is impossible for farmers to avoid the scope of the regulation
short of ceasing to produce crops entirely. 145 Functionally this is not
dissimilar to a shakedown, where individuals pay whatever they are told "for
their own protection." Moreover, if farmers deliberately chose not to
participate in interstate commerce and sold their product to passersby on
the street, they would still face the regulation.1"
The Wickard and Raich principles, however, are inherently impractical.
The lasting principle from Wickard is that although one person's
noncompliance with an agricultural output regulation may be miniscule, if
all farmers acted in a similar way, there would be a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 147 The Evans Court suggested that the government
does not force them to grow raisins.148 If they are unsatisfied with the
regulatory scheme they do not have to engage in that activity. The question
then becomes, what if all California raisin farmers acted accordingly? At
such a time, the purpose of the law would without a doubt be achieved; the
price of raisins will be high. Would the government then attempt to force
unwilling farmers to grow raisins under the Commerce Clause? Though
there is no Supreme Court holding forbidding such use of power, the
Roberts Court has suggested it would not condone regulation of economic
inactivity.149
142Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 19, Evans v.
States, 250 F. App'x. 321 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 07-871), 2008 WL 275503.
United 143

Id

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1 (2005) The Court held that Congress may ban the use of
marijuana even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes and upheld the Wickard substantial
effects test, see id. at 19, and therefore despite the developments of Lopez and Morrison, the Wickard
standard is still valid law and was a major basis for the Court's conclusion.
145See Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation, supranote 143.
14
'4

6

Id.

See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28.
Evans v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 554, 564 (2006), afd,250 F. App'x 321 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
149 See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). Despite upholding the overall constitutionality
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's individual mandate, Chief Justice Roberts clearly
stated it was not within the permissible bounds of the Commerce Clause for Congress to justify
regulation of inactivity. The Chief Justice analogized the requirement to purchase health insurance to
the compelled purchase of broccoli in rejecting the notion that an item such as health care is not
147
14
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In addition, despite the fondness of the judiciary of invoking the
Commerce Clause, no court has ever held that the Commerce Clause
trumps, eviscerates, or eliminates the Takings Clause in a physical takings
case.150 Raisins are private, personal property recognized under California
state law.1 ' No just compensation was paid for the reserve tonnage and the
government imposing fines for failure to transfer title creates an oxymoronic
position: the government cannot deny just compensation and then impose
monetary penalties for failure to turn the property over.15 2 The government
essentially expects producers to bear the entirety of the risk involved with
raising crops while claiming ownership in the fruits of their efforts, and
penalizing them for obtaining fair market value outside of the program."s3
For a law allegedly created to ensure economic security for farmers, it is
difficult to see how this is little else than a classic example of government
flexing its authoritative muscle over the people. Thus, while the Wickard
substantial effects doctrine can remain constitutional, a ruling in favor of
the Horne claim would require just compensation for any crops seized over
the regulatory quota.
Agricultural marketing orders are, without a doubt, takings of an
individual's private personal property. Regulatory action may be taken by
the government under the Commerce Clause, but the Takings Clause
requires just compensation where a property deprivation has occurred.154
Moreover, the Supreme Court should use cases like Horne as a way to more
clearly define the line between takings and interstate commerce authority, a
line could finally be drawn signifying limits of the Commerce Clause. In
addition to creating more judicially manageable standards of interpretation,
it would be a useful way for courts to roll back outdated New Deal
programs, which for contemporary purposes only exist to shackle and

purchased for "its own sake." See id. at 2591. While there is no formal holding on the Commerce Clause
issue in NFIB, the Chief Justice's perspective and the similar position articulated by the dissenting
Justices suggests a majority of the current Court believes that compelled participation in commerce is
beyond the outer limits of the Commerce Clause.
.5o
Brief for Appellants at 47, Home v. Dep't of Agric., 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10WL 6039402.
15270),152010
1

d.

152See id. at

48.
49-50.
154See KaiserAetna, 444 U.S. at 180.
1s3 See id. at
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confuse modern famers. Indeed, if the regulations were so helpful and

necessary to economic stability, it is hard to imagine why so many farmers
do not wish to participate.
VI. CONCLUSION
While American jurists once labored to protect property owners from
government

interference,

progressive

political

theory

replaced

that

presumption with its antithesis. The New Deal created a legal and
economic ideological shift that has not been seen since. The Agricultural
Marketing Order of 1937 and its subsequent state authorization applicable
to California raisins is an example of government intrusion into markets
price fixing that wound up hurting more than it helped.
Further, because such an action directly implicated private property, it

falls squarely within the domain of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Congress has used the Commerce Clause as a mechanism for
involvement into private market for decades. In Wickard v. Filburn,
Congress even allowed Congress to delve into private, but not public
behavior. As such, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity in Horne v.
Department ofAgriculture to place a limitation on congressional commerce
power and dearly define takings law.
The Horne litigation presents further inquiries on the matter and gives
the Supreme Court a rare second chance to review the case. The law is very
much in the air, and one can only hope that the Supreme Court utilizes this
opportunity to reexamine the current state of the law and confer more
rights to individual property owners. Indeed, in a world of economic
hardship and hunger, it is hard to imagine a robust defense to a law
designed solely to ensure high prices for food. Such a ruling would achieve
the economic policy goals of the Court and align with the original aims of
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.

